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INTRODUCTION : LESSONS FROM HORROR
Twentieth century physicians are proud to be biological scientists . It is this
feature above all others that distinguishes us fr om our predecesso rs. Because it is
the ba dge of our progress in medicine, biology is often co nsidered the essential
core of medical care . Indeed , we can become so focused upon th e biology in
medicine that all other aspects of ca r ing for patients fade into a murky
background of ill-defined sentimentality.
Sometimes it is necessary to look outside of medicin e if we are to reawaken
ourselves to the broader role of medicine in society. One unl ikely but fertil e
source of ins ight about medicine is the classic horror movie Invasion of the Body
Snatchers, made in 1956 and, to a somewhat lesser extent, th e 197 8 rem ake of
th is movie. In both of these movies we are presented with the possibility that
those people who we know the best and love the most ma y be imposters. We thus
confront the fear that our intimacy an d affection for th e people closest to us ma y
be for naught. Viewing the movie as physicians, we must confront the fact that
"body-snatching" is tak en by all concerned to be a medical probl em .
In these movies body-snatching takes place as follows. Ali en s arriving
through 'deep space' from a dy ing planet fall to earth wh ere th ey tak e root and
grow into giant po ds . While their victim sleeps, a duplicate of th e victim grows
wit hin the pod. After differentiating into an identical replica of th e human , th e
new body awakens from the pod whi le the original body withers away. Having
snatched a body for its use, the alien assumes the roles and re lat ionships of the
person whose body he now inhabits.
The movies begin wit h scattered people complaining to som e tr usted
authority (a small-town doctor in the original , a public health field-in vestigato r
in the remake) that their loved ones are 'd iffe ren t,' that they are no longer the
same people. In the original, J immy Grimaldi complains, " She isn 't my mother;
don't let her get me." When Wi lma Lenz is asked how th e new Uncle Ira is
different from the o ld Uncle Ira she replies, " T here is no differen ce you can
actually see. He looks, soun ds, acts, and remembers like Uncle Ira. "
In their fear of the body-snatchers, the citizens of Santa Mira mimic a
psyc h iatric syndrome described by the French psychiatrist Capgras in 1923 (1).
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T he essential featu re of Ca pgras' synd rome is the delusion on the part of th e one
afflicted that persons who are very important and fam iliar to him ha ve be en
replaced by doubles (2). Indeed, th e syndrome sometimes tak es the form where
th e doubles are seen as invaders fr om outer space (3) . This syn drome has always
been fou nd in the co ntex t of another psychosis, usuall y schizophrenia . It is
described as int ell ectual recognition in th e absence of emotional famil iarity
(some wha t th e inverse of deja vu). It ha s been exp lained both neurophysio logi-
ca lly (4) and psych odynamically (5). My purpose in this essay is no t to seek a
better ex plana tion for this syndrome. It is rather to examine the impact of this
threat of th e dissociation o f intell ect and feeling, of body and soul, upon soc ie ty
and medicin e as a whole.
For th ose whose bodies have been snatched , body and sou l have been
disconnected. Their body no longer manifests th eir soul's reality. Externally,
no th ing is different, wh ile in te rna lly, nothing is the same. The appearan ce of
th ese people now belies rather than reveal s th eir reali ty.
This d issociation of body fr om soul and appearance from reality repeats as
d ram a th e very situ ation into whi ch Rene Descartes placed himself at the
begin n ing of h is fa mous Meditations. Desca rtes' purpose in these Meditations was
to di scover a sec ure foundat ion up on which a " fir m and permanent structure"
of scient ific knowledge could be ba sed. As a fir st ste p toward th is goal, Descartes
so ug h t to fr ee himsel f of th e scholast icism th at dominated the int e llectu a l
cl imate of his day. He wanted to make possible a bod y of na tural sciences
un encumbered by Aristotelean metaphysics. To th is end, he sought to " . . .
ser io usly and freel y address mysel f to th e upheaval of all my former opinions."
He thus employe d a 'method of doubt' accordi ng to wh ich he agreed to " . ..
withhold my asse nt from matters whic h are not entirely certain and indubita-
ble ."
In pursu ing this method , Descartes did not scrutinize each of h is beliefs
sing ly, "whic h would be an end less undertak ing," but sought to di sco ver and
d iscard a ll the dubitabl e beli e fs th at underlie our kn owledge. By subjecting those
basic beliefs that we ta ke most for gra nte d to the most severe doubt possible ,
Descartes sought to find absolutely indubitable bel ie fs to se rve as the foundati on
fo r his edifice of kn owledge. Howeve r , to mount an d sustain such a doubt was no
easy tas k. To proceed from th e possib ility that any ofour beliefs might be false to
th e possibil ity tha t all our beliefs might be false is an implau sible inferen ce for
wh ich even Descartes had diffi culty providing a reasonable basis: "How are we
to deny th e obvious without being mad?"
To mak e h is hy pe r bo lic doubt plausibl e , Desca rtes postul ated an evil dem on
wit h th e capaci ty to separate appeara nce from real ity: " I shall then suppose , not
th at God, who is supre mely good and th e foundati on of truth, but some evil
ge nius not less power ful than deceitful , has employed his whole energies in
dece iving me . . ." ( I) . T he ev il demon is th e vehicle by whic h he makes co ncrete
what I will ca ll " the Cartesian threat": that what we see may te ll us nothing of
MEDICINE AND THE CA RTESIAN THREAT 53
what truly exists, that the behavior of others may reveal no thi ng of their true
beliefs.
Insofar as th is threat of universal error applies to our kn owledge of other
people, it is the same threat as that posed by the body-snatch e rs. For Descar tes
under the method of doubt , as well as for those inhabitants of a world in which
body-snatchers are known to be loose, proofmust preced e trust. Eac h pe rson is not
himse lf until he is proven to be. This is a remarkable inversion in both common
sense and common decency. It is the genius of these movies that they effectively
dramatize this interpersonal state. By looking at the Invasion ofthe Body-Snatchers
movies as d ramatizations of the Cartesian threat of universal dece it , pret ense
and dissimulation, we will be able to see that this th reat is not merely an
epistemologist's pedantry, but an inchoate evil that haunts our dail y lives.
O pposite this danger lies the safe haven to which we run. In th ese movies
the Cartesian threat ca lls forth a medica l response. For all th e miracles of
modern medicine, it remains curious that the dissociation of soul from body is
considered a problem for phys icians. Precisely why is th e Cartesian threa t of
un ive rsal dissimulation considered a medical problem? Examining this quest ion
will allow us to better understand how the role of medicine in society ex tends
beyond its battle with bacteria, cancer, and heart di sease . We will see how
medicine functions as both defender against th e Cartesian threat and as itsel f a
perpetrator of this threat. Throughout, I will focu s specifica lly on the Cartesian
dissociation of proof from trust. I will not di scuss Desca rtes' own ideas about
medicine which have been discussed recently elsewhere (7).
BODY SNATCHING AS THE WORK OF DESCART ES' DEMON
The specia l tal ent of Descartes' demon is to syste ma tica lly d isconnect
appearance from reality. In our everyday lives we ma y misinte rpret an y given
appearance. We all live with the natural threat of occasional er ror : th at ma y not
be Aunt Betty in the distance but some other woma n. T he general and
systemat ic di ssociation of appearance from reality perpetrated by Descar tes'
demon is a problem not mere ly of greater degree , but of an ent irely different
kind. After such a d issociaton, evidence leads awa y from rather th an toward
truth . There remains no reliable means to distinguish mere appea rance from
reality .
In the original movie, the psychiatrist , Dan Kaufman , evokes just this sta te
as he admonishes Dr. Bennell after Ben ne ll reports he ha s fou nd a co py of his
friend Jack growing on his bill iard table: "Men, women, and children had j ust
discovered that their relatives weren't their re lat ives at all. So your mind started
playing tricks and rea lity became unreality. The dead man became Jack 's doubl e
in your eyes. " He goes on to explain that he is convinced Bennell is repo rting
appearance accurately but that it has nothing to do with reality. " It happen ed in
eve ry detail , but only in your mind." By separating appearance fr om real ity the
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demon isolates us in our mind apart from the real world and fr om other
people.
Each human has the capacity to dissociate his personal appearance from his
personal reality. That is, each of us can dissemble or dissimulate by hidin g under
a false appearance . This is most obvious in cases of prolonged or e laborate deceit
such as that of a traitor or spy. For these people, loyalty, patriotism, and indeed
the vast majority of their lives, can become mere appearance.
Two things are unique about this dissociation as it is found in Descartes an d
in these movies. First , the Demon and the Body-snatchers impose the d issimu-
lated state. Their victims do not choose to deceive. This produces th e second
unique aspect. Dissimulation ceases to be a specific act and becomes an end uring
state; it becomes the rule rather than the exception in human interaction. In a
way independent of the victim's will, his human body is transformed into a human
guise. The victim's body is now a mask that conceals rather than reveals hi s true
nature. Thus sudden and total transformation is new to Dr. Bennell : " In my
practice I've seen people's humanity drain away, but slowly, not all at once."
Once snatched, people are no longer able to express feelings or perhaps even to
have them.
This erosion of trust served Descartes' purposes well. H e hoped to replace
trust with proof in all matters of knowledge. He sought to take nothing for
granted and thereby build a secure foundation for knowledge once and fo r a ll.
Trust, like faith is always vulnerable to doubt and will be systema ticall y
suppressed in a method of doubt.
In the original movie, this erosion of trust produces the rapid e rosion of th e
community. Objectively, the community is being taken over by aliens in famil ia r
human bodies. This is enough by itself to destroy the most stable of communi-
ties. Yet, running before this like a wave through the town is the subjective sense
of distrust. People cease to rely upon the web of interrelations that hold th e
community together. Neighbors, police, the telephone compa ny are successively
co-opted. Through all this travail they rely first and last upon th ei r physician .
MEDICINE AS THE DEFENDER AGAINST THE BODY SNATCHERS
At the beginning of the original movie, we see Dr. Miles Bennell hu rrying
back from a medical convention in response to an urgent message fr om h is
nurse. His patients have been demanding to see him for two weeks but won 't tell
anyone else why. There is a rumor about people who believe their r elatives are
imposters. Upon arriving in town, Dr. Bennell ruminates " . . . every th in g look ed
the same but wasn 't ... something evil had taken possession of the town ."
Here at the beginning of the film, so early as to almost escape notice, it is
established that body-snatching is a medical problem. Without an y prompting by
those in authority, the populace decides that this inexplicable transformation in
their loved ones is something to bring to the attention of their fa mily doctor.
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Eventually a psychiatrist is also consulted, but the clergy are conspicuous in their
absence.
The people of Santa Mira expect Dr. Bennell not only to know what to do
for those snatched but a lso to be able to determine who has been snatched and
what that consists of. Becky queries: "What's going on? Maybe you can tell
me-you're the doctor." That is, he is expected to perform tasks of both
medical therapeutics and diagnosis . In the beginning this presents the difficult
problem of determining whether it is the one transformed or the one witnessing
the transformation that requires treatment. Dr. Bennell chaste ns Wilma Lenz,
"No one could impersonate your Uncle Ira without yo ur seeing a mill ion little
differences. . .. When you see this you will realize th e trouble is inside you."
The nature of the trouble inside Wilma Lenz or, for that matter, inside her
Uncle Ira, is not immediatel y clear. Wilma could be perceiving th ings falsely due
to some disorder inside her mind or Ira could be act ing odd ly d ue to some
disorder ins ide h is body. The problem could be psychiatric or medical.
Insofar as the problem is thought to originate inside th e body of those
afflicted it is interpreted as a medical disorder. This is cons iste nt with co ntempo-
rary medical practice. Problems within society are deemed medical insofar as
they appear to spring from sources intrinsic to the body.
Since approximately 1800 when autopsy-based clin ico-pathological correla-
tion became the gold standard in medical diagnosis, th e desir e to kn ow the
nature of disease has taken the form of a desire to open the body so as to be able
to loo k inside. Thereby, as Michel Foucault explains in his The Birth of the Clinic
(8), the physician can directly confront disease with his own eyes . The lesion
visib le wit hin the patient's body is the now sensible source for th e patien t's
symptoms. The physician no longer need rely solely upon th e patient's report of
his illness; he can open the body and see the disease itsel f. Cirrhosis of th e liver
and emphysema of the lungs thus cease to be experien ces or iginat ing in the
darkness of our bodies, for now they can be directly seen. T his desire to open
bodies to get to the bottom of things medical can be found in the original
movie.
Miles is called to his friend Jack's house because Jack has di sco vered a body
on his billiard table . Miles is expected to diagnose the situation . Adopting the
medical attitude, he remar ks that" . .. (the) face is vague ... (the) body has all its
features but no detai l. It is not a corpse-what else cou ld it be?" T he body is not
alive, but it is not a usual dead body either. The distinctively medical impulse of
Dr. Ben ne ll is to open the body to find out what is going on. He checks his
impulse , however , with these words. "It sounds crazy, but if! did an au topsy, I 'd
find every organ in perfect condition . As perfect as th e body is externally,
everything in working order." Dr. Bennell already senses, albeit vagu ely, that
body-snatching is not a disease that can be known in th e usual medical manner.
Body-sna tching is a disease of the soul , an organ not easily reveal ed at autopsy.
To the extent that Dr. Bennell's task of defending th e populace is a task of
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medical diagnosis, he must be able to determine: who is al r eady sna tched? At the
beginning of the movie this consists in determining whether it isJimmy Grimaldi
or his mother who is sick, whether Wilma Lenz or her Uncle Ira has changed. By
the middle of the movie the task simply becomes one of determin ing who can be
trusted. One cannot trust the body-snatchers to admit that th ey have been
snatched. One cannot rely upon trust to determine when trust is appropriate.
Medical diagnosis, if it is to be useful here , must be abl e to determine whether
someone has been snatched or not without relying upon th ei r veracity.
The attempt to know another person in a way immune to that person's
capacity to conceal his true thoughts and feelings is di stincti vely Cartesian . It is
based upon th e idea that to know another we must know th e one inside the body.
One must not trust the body, but rather peel ba ck its covering to confront
directly the feelings inside. The postulated power of Descartes' Demon means
that behavior ma y tell nothing of belief. In th e presence of this Demo n- or the
body-snatchers-we must assume that th e appeara nce of the other belies his
reality. In order to know the other's ex per ience, th erefore , we must gain an
acce ss to it more immediate and foolproof than hi s own words . T he diagnosti-
cian of body-snatching must find a way of inferring fr om oute r behavior to inner
belief that is independent of the will of th e one being kn own. As th e philosopher
Stanley Cavell has explained, this absolute susp icion of th e o ther translates into a
temptation to penetrate the other, to look inside hi s ex per ience-or his
body-to determine what is really there (9). In its impulse to <'pen the body,
medicin e seeks to root out th e body snatchers and defeat the Demon.
It is likely that all th ese attempts to directl y confr ont th e snatcher's soul
would fail. The inside of snatch ed bodies would look as human as their outside
does. Even Dr. Bennell realizes that to open th e body on J ack 's billiard table
would likely reveal nothing abnormal. We would be ab le 'to see inside ,' but the
Cartesian impulse to bypas s th e other in order to know him would be thwarted.
We would not ha ve ach ieved a way of compar ing what the other shows
outwardly with what is going on inside his experien ce . The body wou ld conceal
our true nature no more or less if it co u ld be seen through , if it were completely
tran sparent. It wou ld remain impossibl e to ac tua lly get inside another's experi-
ence through th is window, or to share their sentien ce. Sta n ley Cavell in The
Claim ofReason comments on th e revelatory power of this fr ustration:
But if looking insid e might not settle the question whether the friend
is a human being, why isn 't this more interesting than ever, o r, if you
like , more amazing th an ever? And doesn 't this at least suggest that we
cannot know that another is se ntient? (5)
This failure is interesting, as Cavell emphas izes, becau se it teaches us that
our kn owledge of another's sentience, of another's humanity, must have a
different ba sis than our kn owledge of hi s body. The experience of th e patient is
not accessible in th e same way that h is body is. T he body can be directly
observed, both inside and out. T he patient can always co nceal his experience
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from the observing eye. Observation can prove its assertions about th e body; the
patient must be trusted to reveal his experience.
MEDICINE AS PERPETRATOR OF THE CARTESIAN THREAT
In its battle against the body-snatchers, medicine is decisively anti-
Cartesian. Dr. Bennell's attempt to identify those wh o have been snatched
means he must joust with the Cartesian demon. As valiant as he may be in this, he
is doomed to fail. As improbable as th e Cartesian threat of to tal d issimulation by
ano ther ma y be, once it is establish ed as a real threat, it is impossible to defea t. If
we must get insid e the other's exper ience to know him , th en we will never know
him.
Nevertheless, through a subt le modification in th e Cartesian threat , medi-
cine manages to defeat it in real life. Medicine , in th e last analysis, a lso seeks to
know the patient by penetrating his body. After a co nfusing and unsuccessfu l
clinical course, all medical eyes turn to the autopsy for answers. Clin icia ns attend
clinicopathological conferences to di scover where th ey went wrong, to discover
what disease was really present. The body is opened and th e d isease is revealed.
Dise ase is not only disco vered but identified and defined by this means. A
patient comes to th e ph ysician with a pain or ot her di sability that he is
experiencing. This di sability acquires its identity as di sease , however, according
to the model of the autopsy, in manner entirely independent of th e patient's
experience of it. Medicine excludes the patient as sentient in its ultimate
identification and definition of disease. Medical diagnosis is th us able to
overcome an y shortcomings in th e patient's perception of his di sease , whether
these be due to ignorance or deceit. Medicine has achieved a way o f kn owin g its
patients that does not re ly on their truthfulness or their capacity fo r se lf-
interpretation.
Medicin e succeeds at this because its goal is humble r than that of th e
Cartesian. Medicine does not seek a way to ind ubita b ly kn ow the experience of th e
o ther entirely without his cooperation as th e Ca rtesian does. Med icine merely
seeks to kn ow th e disease o f th e other independent o f his cooperation. It is in th e
distinction between the experience of th e disea se and th e disease itself that th e
key to medicine's success in knowing th e o ther lies. Because it p ursues a
mind-independent disease, medicine need not penetrat e th e ex perience of th e
other-only his body. Inflamed meninges and th e infl am ed appe nd ix can be
seen and known independently of patients' knowledge or interpretation o f
th em. Their primary rea lity is no longer exper ien tial, as might be explored
through dialogue with the patient , but pathological , somethi ng encountered
through th e autopsy o r o ne of its surrogates such as x-rays or biopsies.
Though medicine' s response to th e Cartesian th reat is not itself classically
Cartesian , becau se medicine accepts th e threat as real and operates as such, it
perpetuates th e power of the Demon. Because ultimate reli an ce upon th e
patient 's re port of his disease exper ience has been re p laced by the direct
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encounter of physician and disease at autopsy as the best evidence for medical
diagnosis, patients' reports receive less attention. They fa ll to the wayside as
incomplete, uninformed, unreliable-as ultimately dispensibl e . They ma y be
false through no fault of the patient, or through his deliberate decept ion if the
patient is malingering. By setting aside the patient 's exper ience in the u lt imate
definition and identification of disease , medicine, in effect, assumes that th e
patient might always be guilty of dec eit , or more commonly, ignorance.
Medicine thus operates as if Descartes' Demon hovered over th e encounter
between patient and physician, a ll his malign power intact. As a pe rpe trato r of
th e Cartesian threat, medicine is itsel f a body-snatch er. When a patient first
comes to the doctor, the only awareness of dis ea se present is his own. The
disorder in his body and his awareness of it are intimately linked. T ogeth e r , they
form a disability that disrupts his life . As the physician becomes acquainted with
th e patient's illness by means of history, physical exa m ina t ion and laborato ry
tests, it is transformed into disease-something defined biologi call y- co m-
pletely independent of the patient's awareness of it. T he body afflicte d wit h this
dis ea se has been transported from th e patient's awareness into that of medical
professionals, tools, and institutions. The patient's interpretation of his malady
is now superceded by th e medical interpretation. T his sickness is now defined
and identified within a medical awareness that is no longe r his own . H is body has
been snatched.
CO NCLUSIO N: SNATCHING BODIES BACK
There is no hope offered that th e cit izens of Santa Mira might find a way to
snatc h th eir bodies back from the aliens. But in rea l life th ere is hope that we
ma y be abl e to snatch our bodies ba ck from co ntempora ry medicine.
The recently elaborated distinction between disease and illn ess should help
us understand how this might occu r. Eric Cassell , a refl ect ive in ternist , has
described illness as " what the patient feels when he goes to th e doctor ," and
disease as " .. . what he has on th e way home from th e doctor's office. Disease,
th en, is something an organ has; illn ess is something a man has" (6). Arthur
Kleinman, a psychiatrist and anth ropologist , explains th at sickness is initia lly
expe r ienced by patients as illn ess: " . . . the life concerns and problems that it
presents for common sense understanding as part of th e every day world of th e
sick person." Biomedical dis ea se, on the other hand, is th e " . . . mech anica l
break down or disruption in biological structures and functions" (10). T hus,
disease is a way of characterizing bodily disorder in a way independent of th e
patient's awareness of it. Disease is defined and identified independent of the
patient's capacity for self-in ter preta tion; it is mind-independent. Illness is
mind-dependent with respect to the patient. Illness is defined and identified by
means of the patient's capacity for se lf-interp reta t io n .
As the autopsy be came incorporated into clinical medicine in th e nine-
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teenth century and clinicopathological correlation became th e fina l word in
knowing disease, it became possib le to define " d isease" in a man ner indepen-
dent of illness. At some point in the contemporary encounte r between docto r
and patient , a backache with fever that prevents a mother from going to her
son's graduation beco mes pyelonep hri t is, an infection in her kidney. It is in th is
transformation from having an illness to having a disease that one's sickness and
one's body are snatched.
There are many benefits to ha ving one's sickness sna tched. Transported
into the te chnologically supported system of medical awa reness, sickness is more
like ly to be cured. As has been well-documented , however, being plugged into
th is system can be intensely dehumanizing. The technologica l imperatives of
modern medicine are diverse and powerful. They have altered th e nature of
birth and death in our society. Medicine assuages our fear of disease by giving us
somewhere to go, something to do. But its priorities are not always our own.
So metimes it seems as if we must give up control of our lives in order to save
them. Intensive-care nurses are often the first to say that th ey would never be a
patient in one of the un its where they work.
H igh-tech medicine is accepted as having many negative side-effects. What
is less accepted is that an exclusive focus on the biological and chemica l ma y not
be the most effective means of dealing with disability, ma y not be th e best way to
get medicine's main job done. Isolation of biological factors from others
relevant to healing can be detrimental to th e efficiency and effectiveness of
medicine. This is especially true in the case of chronic diseases suc h as d iabetes
where good care requires active patient participation. It is a lso true in those
common situations where primary care physicians confront soma t ic equiva lents
of depression or anxiety in their patients. The relentless " r ule out" of organic
causes in these situations can be wasteful (e .g ., coronary arteriogram s for pan ic
disorder) or even misleading (e.g., the silent gall stone seen as ca use for
functional abdomina l pain).
This debate is far beyond my sco pe here. I will j us t mention in passing th at
at issue here is the very identity of medicine as a science. Is medicine a purely
natural science which limits its concern to disordered biology? Or is it more
effectively seen as a human or social science which fundamentall y addresses th e
experience of disabi lity? A move from the former to th e latter will be necessary if
medicine's body-snatching propensities are to be cur bed .
The fears of the people of Santa Mira as the body-snatchers begin to take
over are fears we each know too well. These very worldly fears include the fear
of isolation , of solitude, of non-communication. They also include fears of
revealing oneself and, perhaps more poignantly, of being un abl e to reveal
oneself. Notably, these are the same fears sickness imposes on us. Eac h of us fears
death, and perhaps more so , the disease and pain that will precede it. Bu t even
when this fate is accepted, the fear of dying alone remains almost universal. T o
face horrible pain tota lly alone, to pa ss from life without a whisper of concern
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from another, these are dire prospect s even after one has accep ted the inevitabil-
ity of death itself. Those who care for us in sickness must respond to this threat
of isolation as well as th e threat of death .
If our soj ourn with the body-snatchers has taught us anything about
Cartesianism in medicine, it is that th e relation between soul and body within
modern medicine must be understood in terms of th e dynamics of proof and
trust between doctor and patient. I have addressed this issue in more detail
elsewhere (11). For now, it must suffice for us to understand slightly better how
proof and trust in medicine help us face death .
Proven knowledge is secure knowledge. It stands firmly in th e face of death.
When isolating the cause of biological death we want to be sure of what we know.
The stakes are too high to accept anything less. We seek to deny death its power
not only over our bodies, but over our knowledge as well. T he Cartesian canons
of proof were designed to produce knowledge that would esca pe death .
Trust is a basis for knowledge that accepts its limits in a way th at proof does
not. Always founded upon uncertainty, it accepts the finitude of our kn owing.
Trust shares our fear of death : that all will not be finished , complete , or sure
when we die.
Clearly, both proof and trust have a role in th e doctor-patient relatio nsh ip
and in medicine as a whole. We expect the scien tific physician to pu rsue
knowledge of our sickness with a rigor commensurate with th e highest standards
of proof. We also expect that we will be able to share our ex perience of sickness
with our physician even though nothing about it can be definitively p roved . It is
this experience that first brings th e patient to his physician. From the patient's
point of view it is the sine qua non of medicine.
In a relatively shor t time medicine has acquired immensely power ful tools
for diagnosis. Now it must employ those tools in a way that does not deny
patients' sentience. The people of Santa Mira would unde rstand only too well
this ne ed to have one's existe nce and exper ience co nfir med by o ther humans.
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